Summary
However, the Hatch-Ryan-Wyden TPA bill as drafted will
inevitably fail to provide the protection against artificially cheap imports
that Americans need and want:
A. The
bill simply repeats ineffective language similar to what has been in the IMF's rule book for years.
B. It
does nothing to provide an enforcement mechanism.
C. It
focuses only on currency manipulation
by TPP members and totally ignores the much bigger and more important problem
of overall currency misalignment.
Background
In theory, lower tariffs and freer trade will increase the overall
well-being of trading partners. Studies of America's recent free trade
agreements such as one by
Gary Hufbauer and colleagues at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics (PIIE) indicate that U.S. exports have indeed risen as
a result of these trade agreements, producing increased employment and income,
at least
in the exporting industries.
Despite differences of emphasis, these studies indicate that
substantial exchange rate adjustments, as recommended by
Bergsten and Gagnon, will be
needed to help balance overall trade and reduce the net loss of jobs in the
economy.
This conclusion is particularly important in the context of
potential trade agreements such as the TPP and the TTIP. America already suffers
from excessive trade deficits – clear proof that the dollar is overvalued
with respect to its trading partners as a whole. Even if imports and exports
were to grow at the same accelerated rate under a free trade agreement such as
the TPP, the absolute value of imports would increase faster than the absolute value
of exports due to the larger initial volume of imports, leading inevitably to larger
trade deficits and higher rates of unemployment.
The only way to prevent this disaster for America is to establish a highly
effective mechanism that would bring about the exchange rate adjustments needed
to balance U.S. trade.
The following summary demonstrates why the draft TPA
legislation language on currency will be as ineffective as language already on
the books in protecting America from unfair competition from artificially cheap
imports.
A. Old Rules - Old Results
As the world's ultimate authority on exchange rates, the IMF
has long sought to impose rules to prevent countries from
manipulating their currencies. However, the IMF's "though shalt
not" rules have never had any real teeth because they cannot be enforced
as written.
A country like China is not going to stop manipulating currency
values simply because the IMF says it should – especially since currency
manipulation has been central to China's highly successful export-based growth
strategy. Rules against currency manipulation must be backed up by a credible
threat of punishment that would inflict costs greater than the benefits the
country believes it derives from manipulating currency values.
Neither the IMF rules nor the Omnibus Act of 1988 has
prevented countries from gaining competitive advantage against the United
States though currency manipulation. The same will be true for the proposed TPA
text on currency.
In fact, without an effective enforcement mechanism, the
bill's language on currency seems to be nothing but a smoke screen designed to
give the appearance of doing something in response to public pressure for
action against currency cheating while allowing America's TPP and TTIP negotiations
to move forward, unencumbered by the need to negotiate anything that will
actually solve the currency problem.
B. The Impossibility
of Meaningful Enforcement Mechanisms in the TPP
The IMF's currency rules lack effective enforcement
mechanisms because, like TPP rules, they are the result of international
negotiations, and no country – whether represented by an Executive
Director on the IMF Board or by a trade negotiator at the TPP sessions – will
agree to enforceable provisions that would prevent them from pursuing policies
they believe to be in their best interests.
American officials, especially those in the White House and
in the Office of the United States Trade Representative, have vigorously
opposed including anything meaningful on currency in the TPP negotiations because
they know that there is basically no chance that their counterparts will agree
to mechanisms that would force them to abandon the exchange rate manipulation
that have been central to their export-oriented development strategies.
C. The Real Issue is Currency Misalignment, Not Currency Manipulation
If America wants to protect its factories and workers from
unfair competition with artificially cheap imports, Americans should not focus
on "currency manipulation" for the following reasons.
1. "Currency manipulation" as
defined by the IMF is a very limited concept.
2. "Currency misalignment" is
far more important than "currency manipulation."
3. "Currency
misalignment" is far easier to fix.
Any one of these points is worth a blog post if not a
complete article, but the following summary underscores why the
Hatch-Wyden-Ryan TPA bill will do nothing significant to protect America from
artificially cheap imports.
1. "Currency manipulation" as defined by the IMF is a limited
and often ambiguous concept
Article IV, Section 1 (iii) of the
Fund’s Articles
provides that members shall “avoid manipulating exchange rates or the
international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments
adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.” The
same document goes on to say that, “Manipulation of the exchange rate is only
carried out through policies that are targeted at—and actually affect—the level
of an exchange rate."
This apparently straightforward language is full of traps
that make "currency manipulation" a non-issue compared to
"currency misalignment." The latter means that a currency is not in
line with its "equilibrium exchange rate," a rate that would balance
imports and exports. Although the language may look similar, the differences
are enormous, and even a cursory review of the definitions indicates why
focusing on currency misalignment is far more important than focusing on the
far more narrow issue of currency manipulation.
- Currency
manipulation can only be done by a government. Manipulation generally
involves central bank interventions in foreign currency markets, while
currency misalignment can be driven by anything, including currency
manipulation, that creates a gap between the market exchange rate and the
currency's equilibrium exchange rate. Other than currency manipulation, the
most common factors that create currency misalignment gaps include differences
between domestic and foreign rates of inflation, productivity growth,
discovery and exploitation of natural resources, demographic changes,
trading patterns, tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Given the restrictive definition of "manipulation,"
countries can easily evade charges of manipulation by making purchases of
foreign currencies and other foreign assets indirectly. For example, such
purchases by state-owned sovereign wealth funds would generally not be
counted as manipulation, even though the effect would be the same.
- Currency
manipulation involves the purchase of foreign currency with domestic currency.
This means, for example, that Japan's (and America's) massive quantitative
easing does not count as currency manipulation even though QE clearly
affects currency values. Likewise,
the focus on "currency" provides a free pass for governments to
purchase foreign assets other than currency.
- Currency
manipulation must involve the intent to gain international
competitive advantage. This means that quantitative easing and most
other policies that affect exchange rates can be "excused" as
being designed to stimulate domestic growth, not to gain competitive
advantage.
In short, currency manipulation as officially defined is a
mouse compared to currency misalignment, which reflects the entire range of
market and non-market forces that affect exchange rates.
2. "Currency
misalignment" is far more important than "currency manipulation"
As Dr. Bergsten mentioned in a recent note to the author,
"When the Chinese intervention and surpluses, and the US deficits, were at
record highs around 2006-08, Joe [Gagnon]’s estimates implied that manipulation
was causing half or even more of our deficits.
Today, by contrast, intervention is much less and the
macro-economic/monetary differences among the advanced countries are much
greater. So, the share of manipulation
in the total is much smaller."
These words from one of the world's leading experts in the field of
international finance indicate that, even if currency manipulation problems could
be solved, which is very doubtful given the political and technical problems
involved, doing so would fix only a small part of America's overall trade
deficit and ot America's related problems--lost jobs and closed factories. Hence
the conclusion:
Congress should focus on fixing currency misalignment, not currency
manipulation.
3. Currency misalignment is far easier to fix that currency
manipulation.
Overall currency misalignment is actually easier to fix than
country-specific currency manipulation for the following reasons:
- Subjective
vs. Objective Indicators. Unlike currency manipulation, which can
be disguised and hidden in a number of ways, currency misalignment is
obvious to anyone looking at a country's trade balance or current account
deficit. A deficit indicates an overvalued currency, while a surplus
indicates an undervalued currency.
- Blame
Games. Trying to fix currency manipulation always involves a blame
game where one sovereign country such as the United States must pin the
red badge of "Manipulator" on another sovereign country such as
China. This game is virtually impossible to win, and it can lead to serious
geopolitical and economic repercussions including currency wars, military
aggressiveness in zones of influence, and a general breakdown of good
trading relations --- key reasons that most Presidential administrations
have refused to declare countries as manipulators under the Omnibus Trade
Act of 1988.
- A
country can fix misalignment directly rather than depending on other
countries to act. At least as far back as the Plaza Accord of 1985,
the United States has tried to solve its trade deficit problems by
forcing other countries to revalue their currencies. This puts foreign
countries in control of America's economic destiny. Not very smart! In
contrast, the United States could easily fix the dollar's overall
misalignment with respect to trading partner countries by moderating the
inflows of foreign capital that drive the dollar's exchange rate up to
levels where U.S. factories and workers are no longer internationally
competitive.
The next post in this series will present a proposal
for moderating capital inflows to levels consistent with a competitive exchange
rate, a proposal that will, at the same time, provide excellent incentives for
continued foreign direct investment in increased U.S. productivity. This
proposal, which could and should be implemented before the TPP goes into
effect, would be fully consistent with international law and with America's
treaty obligations to its trading partners.
Conclusion
The currency language in the Hatch-Wyden-Ryan TPA bill
offers virtually no protection to American factories and workers from imports
made artificially cheap by distorted currency values. America needs and
deserves more. Freer trade can bring great benefits to the American people --
but only if the dollar is at a competitive equilibrium level -- a level that
allows Americans to earn as much producing exports as they spend on imports.
America Needs a Competitive Dollar - Now!