Background
When inflation threatens
America’s stability and economic growth, the Fed raises the Federal Funds
Rate (FFR). This reduces domestic demand for borrowed
funds, and that reduces the growth of domestic money in
circulation and thus the rate of inflation.
This approach worked
reasonably well from the 1930s when the FFR became an official policy
tool of the Fed until the Crash of 2008 when FFR targeting had
to be augmented by quantitative easing (QE) because it would be difficult
if not impossible to move the FFR below zero.
Why just “reasonably
well“? Although few analysts have focused on the fact, the Achilles
Heel of the Fed Funds Rate system became exposed in the
1970s during the OPEC Oil Crises. During the 1970s and early 1980’s,
oil prices rose from about $3/bbl. to well over $30/bbl,
forcing Americans to pay billions of additional dollars to Gulf
State oil exporters. At the time, the Gulf States were relatively small, poor,
and served by rather primitive domestic financial systems.
The tiny upper crust that controlled the oil revenues could
not or would not spend all this new money. Interest rates
were near zero because of limited demand, excessive supply, and
Islamic limits on charging interest.
No surprise, then, that
the Gulf States sent billions of their excess petro-dollars back to
America where AAA corporate bonds were paying 8-10 percent. This
massive infusion of dollars back into the American economy immediately
triggered inflation, which rose from a minimum of about 1 percent in the
early 1970s to nearly10 percent by the end of the decade.
Paul Volcker became Chair
of the Federal Reserve in August 1979 under President Jimmy
Carter and, desperate to control America’s run-away
inflation, accelerated the increases in the FFR.
The Achilles Heel of
using the Fed Funds Rate to control inflation suddenly became obvious – at
least in retrospect. The FFR, which today is effectively
zero, jumped from about 5 percent in 1976 to over 16
percent in 1980 – and peaked at over 20 percent on several
occasions in late 1980 and early 1981. The close-to-zero rates in the
dollar-flush Gulf States, and the overnight Fed Funds Rate that sometimes
exceeded 20 percent created a massive opportunity for interest rate
arbitrage.
At this point, the real
problem of trying to control inflation with nothing but the Fed Funds Rate
became obvious – at least in hindsight. Even though a major share of the money
returning was in dollars, the flood of carry-trade money coming into
the US economy created a tremendous demand for dollar-based assets by
pushing up the prices of stocks and other US assets. As a result, the
trade-weighted exchange rate for the dollar (TWEXBMTH) as calculated by the
Federal Reserve roughly doubled between 1980 and 1985. This led the
US current account as a share of GDP to plunge from a balanced position in 1980
to a deficit exceeding 3 percent of GDP by 1985.
A three
percent deficit, commonly regarded by the IMF and the World Bank
as the red line between sustainability and ultimate disaster, shook
the US administration so deeply that in 1985 it used
the still-hegemonic power America enjoyed at the time as the
world’s defense against the Red Threat to force Japan and Germany to
agree, in the “Plaza Accord,”
to drive their currencies up by about 50 percent
against the dollar by using their dollar reserves (from trade surpluses
and Marshall Plan grants). In effect, the US forced a 50
percent devaluation of the dollar against the yen and the deutschmark.
Lesson
for Today
The Fed Funds Rate worked
reasonably well when international trade in financial assets was a mere
footnote to trade in real goods and services, Today, however, using the Fed
Funds Rate to fight inflation can cause serious problems because
resulting increases in interest rate differentials encourage
investors from abroad to bring their money into the US where
interest rates are higher and rising. This extra demand for dollars and
dollar-based assets overvalues the dollar, driving US trade deficits – a process
summarized in Annex A.
MAC as the Solution
All of these problems
associated with raising the Fed Funds Rate to control inflation could be
avoided by introducing a policy that would moderate the flow of foreign-source
money into US financial markets when carry-trade is triggered by raising US
interest rates relative to those abroad.
The Market Access Charge (MAC) is the needed policy instrument. The MAC, a small variable tax
on incoming capital flows, would rise when US trade deficits rise and fall when
trade deficits fall. This would keep the inflow of foreign capital and
upward pressure on the dollar‘s value consistent with a
dollar exchange rate that is consistent with balanced trade.
If a rising Fed Funds
Rate began to trigger excessive inflows of foreign money and an overvalued
exchange rate, the rising trade deficits would trigger the MAC. By reducing the spread between US and foreign
market yields, the MAC would make carry
trade and interest rate arbitrage less attractive. Inflows would
shrink, allowing the dollar to return to trade-balancing levels.
Farewell
Squanderville
In his classic
article in Fortune entitled America’s
Growing Trade Deficit Is Selling the Nation Out from Under Us,Warren
Buffett used a parable of two islands, Thriftville and Squanderville, to
highlight the dangers of constantly spending more on imports that we earn with
exports. As you have probably guessed, the people
of Squanderville mortgaged and then sold all of their
land and other productive assets to Thriftville to pay for their trade
deficits. Forever after, residents of Squanderville served as
under-paid workers beholden for their survival to Thriftville.
America clearly was not
in that position in 2003 when Buffett wrote his thought-provoking piece, nor is
it today, but it is worth noting that America’s net debt to foreigners as
a share of GDP has risen from 20 percent of GDP when Buffett wrote his
article to about 70 percent last year, more than tripling in less than 20
years – while increasing by a factor of six in absolute dollars. The
recent underlying growth rates are even more worrisome. From 2017 to 2020 our
net external debt grew by 22.5% per year while our GDP grew at only one-tenth
that rate – 2.4% per year.
These trends are clearly
unsustainable. If both indicators continued to grow at the same rate,
our net debt to foreigners would exceed 100% of GDP by 2023. It is
impossible to say at what point our economy would collapse because of excessive
net debt to foreigners, but it is worth thinking about the
following example:
(a) The
US pays 5 percent annual interest on foreign borrowings;
(b) its
outstanding debt is 100 percent of GDP (which could easily happen
within the next few years), and
(c) GDP
growth averages about 2.5% per year – somewhat faster than the actual
average from 2016-2019.
Under these conditions,
America’s entire annual growth would cover only half of the debt service owed.
The rest would have to be paid by (a) taking on more Ponzi-type debt, (b) reducing
living standards below levels of previous years to save the additional 2.5% of
GDP required to service foreign debt, and/or by selling off America’s assets,
both financial and real. In short, continuing on our present
path means stealing from our children.
But America does not have
to go down this fateful road. If the Fed adds the MAC to its monetary
policy toolkit to moderate foreign demand for dollars and dollar-based asset
and if it maintains the Fed Funds Rate to moderate domestic demand
for dollars and dollar-based assets, the dollar will soon move back to a fully
competitive rate that allows Americans to earn as much producing exports as
they spend on imports. At this point, the current account will be
balanced.
Once this happens, America’s
net debt to foreigners should stop growing, and as GDP continues to grow – and
it will do so at an accelerated rate because the MAC will stimulate
domestic production of additional goods to meet the additional foreign and
domestic demand for made-in-America products, America’s net debt to foreigners
can actually begin to return to more sustainable levels.
Annex
A: Transmission Mechanism: Fed Funds Rate to Trade Deficits
·
Yield Spread: Raising
the Fed Funds Rate increases the average interest rate spread between US and
developed foreign countries.
·
Carry Trade: This
encourages speculators to borrow at low interest rates in Japan, for example,
and to invest in the US where interest rates are higher.
·
Exchange Rate Pressure:
·
Dollar: The money borrowed
abroad must usually be sold for dollars before being invested in US assets,
thus increasing the demand for and the price of dollars.
·
Other Currencies: The
increased supply of yen to international forex markets, for example, will tend
to push the yen’s value down relative to other currencies.
·
Net Effect: The
dollar becomes increasingly overvalued and the US suffers
trade deficits.
·
Domestic Money Supply:
·
Increased purchasing power in US: When
the US Government borrows from US residents to cover its budget deficits, this
shifts purchasing power from the private to the public sector within America.
However, borrowing from abroad injects additional purchasing
power and thus inflationary pressures into the US economy.
·
Money Multiplier and Reserve
Requirements: When the USG disburses the money borrowed from abroad to
pay staff, contractors, suppliers, etc., most recipients get the payments
either as direct transfers to their commercial bank accounts or as checks soon
deposited therein. Such deposits add directly to the money circulating in
America. Even worse, if the fractional reserve requirement is 10%, a million
dollars that is borrowed by selling Treasuries to Japan, for example, and that
is deposited into the US banking system can ultimately inject up to $10 million
of additional spending power – and up to $100 million if the reserve
requirement is only 1%. As of March 26, 2020, the Fed reduced the reserve
requirement to zero. (I don’t know how to calculate that multiplier!)
·
Inflation:
·
MV=PQ. Because V varies
with the demand for money, this famous equation does not necessarily predict
what will happen to prices if M increases. However, cet. par., the
money multiplication (∆Q)
caused by the inflow of foreign capital and its relenting under our fractional
reserve banking systems is likely to increase P if Q does not increase
correspondingly – a very real possibility given today’s supply chain problems.
·
Overvalued Dollar:
·
Trade-Weighted Exchange Rate. If
domestic prices (P) increase faster than foreign prices because of such
inflows, the dollar is likely to become further overvalued in real terms at the
current exchange rate because higher domestic prices make imports relatively
cheaper and US exports increasingly too expensive to compete.
·
Trade Deficits. As
imports increase relative to exports, the trade deficit increases potentially
causing serious damage to economic growth, employment, manufacturing capacity,
financial stability, social and political polarization, and high net debt to
foreign countries.
Impossible
Trinity: Augmenting the FFR with the MACbreaks the Mundell-Fleming
“Impossible Trinity” which states that a country cannot have a fixed exchange
rate, an independent monetary policy, and free international capital movement.
With a MACin place, a country can have an independent monetary policy using
the FFR & QE, a stable exchange rate that always trends toward balance, and
free international capital flows with no quotas or fixed barriers.
About the Author
Dr. John R. Hansen is a member of the CPA Advisory Board. A former Economic Adviser at the World Bank, he has four decades of first-hand experience in countries around the world with global trade. Now “retired,” he has developed a fundamentally new global monetary mechanism that will balance America’s international trade, restore thousands of American factories to profitable operation, put millions of Americans back to work at well-paying jobs, halt America’s growing dependence on imported goods from countries like China, and start reducing America’s heavy burden of debt to foreign countries, debt that will otherwise burden our children and grandchildren. This revolutionary mechanism, which is fully legal under international and US law, will work without illegal protectionist trade measures because it ties exchange rates to balanced trade, not to the traditional failed anchors such as piles of precious metals like gold or to the workings of imaginary “perfectly functioning” markets.
America Needs a Competitive Dollar - Now!